Reconciling Fairness and Racial Preference by Grover, Susan
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media Faculty and Deans
1990
Reconciling Fairness and Racial Preference
Susan Grover
William & Mary Law School, ssgrov@wm.edu
Copyright c 1990 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media
Repository Citation
Grover, Susan, "Reconciling Fairness and Racial Preference" (1990). Popular Media. Paper 287.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/287
LEGAL TIMES. WEEK Of JULY 2, 1990 23 
ANALYSIS 
Reconciling Fairness and Racial Preference 
, , I nd ividuals who believe their 
rigbts have been violated are en-
titled to their day in court ," 
Pre ident George Bush declared earlier 
this spring , speaking of white males who 
feel aggrieved by affirmative-action plans . 
" [E]mployers who seek to comply with 
the law by remedying past discrimination 
[should not be subjected] to a never-
ending stream of litigation and potential 
liability , " wrote Justice John Paul Stevens 
in a di senting Supreme Court opinion last 
year. 
Both the president and the justice are 
correct, and therein lies a headache: bal-
ancing the rights o f white employees 
against the rights and interests of minority 
employees and employers who attempt to 
remedy race discrimination through race-
con cious hiring and promotion. Indeed, 
whether and when whites should be al-
lowed to bring reverse-discrimination 
suits to challenge consent decrees and 
litigated judgments arising out of earlier 
race-discrimination suits is one of the 
more controversial questions raised by the 
civil-rights bill now before Congress. 
The answer provided by the proposed 
Civil Right Act of 1990--to bar such 
challenge outright in most cases--is, by 
and large, fitting . Without such bars, end-
less rever e-discrimination suits against 
affinnative-action hiring and promotion 
provisions in decrees and judgments will 
prevent the re olution of race-discrimi-
nation cases. 
Still , the bill's opponent have a valid 
concern: binding those who were not par-
tie and who had never even heard about 
tbe earlier suit threatens to violate basic 
principles offaime s. 
The debate was spawned last year by 
the Supreme Court's decision in Martin v. 
Wilks, 109 S . Ct. 2 180 (1989). Before this 
decision , federal courts genera1Jy barred 
white employees who did not intervene in 
a n employm ent-d is c r im i na t ion s uit 
brought by minority employees under Ti-
tle VII of the C ivil Rights Act of 1964 
from later challenging any race-conscious 
order arising out of the suit. In Wilks, the 
high court struck down this j udge-made 
" impermissible collateral attack " rule . 
The majority opinion , written by Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist (the d issent was 
Justice Stevens', quoted above), held that 
white employees who are not parties to a 
suit are not obliged to intervene; instead , 
the original parties must bring the white 
employees into the suit (through the join-
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der provisions of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure) . Only then can the white 
employees, as parties , be bound by the 
outcome of the case. 
It sounds simple- but the notion that 
joinder of white employees is a realistic 
solution to the problem of interminable 
reverse-discrimination litigation is dis-
ingenuous. In fact , after Wilks , there are 
no practical limits on the ability of white 
employees to challenge affmnative action. 
If the original parties to the original 
race-discrimination suit-the one brought 
by minority employees--folJow the Wilks 
drill and join all white employees , the 
prospect of a settlement that will actually 
bind all parties is unlikely . This is because 
a 1986 Supreme Court decision held that 
even white employees who are parties to a 
suit are not bound by a consent decree un-
less they consent to the terms of the de-
cree . Joinder and an opportunity to be 
heard are not enough to bind them. 
Thus, there is nothing partie to a Title 
VII suit can do to ensure that an affirma-
tive-action plan will go into and remain in 
effect. The aftermath of Wilks has already 
been a wave of collateral attacks across the 
country. 
SEE RACIAL PREfERENCE, PAGE 24 
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The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 
responds to this vexing problem by adopt-
ing the impermissible collateral attack 
doctrine as statutory law. Under the bill , 
three categories of employees would be 
barred from bringing reverse-discrimina-
tion suits challenging affirmative-action 
plans arising out of Title VII cases: 
• Category J: Those with sufficient 
notice and an opportunity to object at the 
time the decree or judgment was entered. 
• Category 2: Those whose interests 
were sufficiently represented in the origi-
nal suit by a person who challenged the 
decree or judgment. 
• Category 3: Those without actual 
notice if the court determined before en-
tering the decree or judgment that reason-
able efforts had been made to give no~ice 
to interested people. The bill states, with-
out specifying procedures, that the notice 
should be consistent with the " constitu-
tional requirements" of due process . 
The first and second categories are rea-
sonable and sufficiently clear; the third is 
problematic. 
The constitutional standard for binding 
persons who did not receive notice of a 
suit was established by the Supreme Court 
in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 
U.S. 306 (1950). In that case, the Court 
said it would apply a "reasonable-under-
the-circumstances" test to the issue. In the 
context of race-conscious remedies for 
employment discrimination , this test 
would seem to require both that the best 
possible effort was made to notify the 
absentees and that the interests of the 
absentees were protected in the original 
litigation. 
If Category 3's reference to "constitu-
tional requirements" is read to incorporate 
this Mullane standard into the bill, then 
that category would be no more than a re-
statement of Category 2. If, however, 
Category 3 has any independent meaning, 
it must mean that unnotified persons 
whose interests were not adequately rep-
resented by parties in the first suit may 
nonetheless be bound. That flies in the 
face of Mullane, however, and would re-
sult in binding absentees who had abso-
lutely no idea-and no reason to know-
that the original suit was under way and 
whose interests were not represented be-
fore the court (such as individuals who 
were not employees at the time of the 
suit). 
Retooled 'Fairness Hearing' 
A good solution to this due-process 
problem would be to devise a new type of 
"fairness hearing"-a variation on the 
hearing that traditionally precedes entry of 
a consent decree-specifically to protect 
the absent, unrepresented Category 3 in-
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dividuals. The hearing would be required 
both for cases that are settled and for those 
that are litigated to final judgment. 
In a traditional fairness hearing , the 
court may hear from certain non-parties, 
such as white employees, who are likely to 
be affe9ted by a consent decree. Such 
hearings should focus on whether the 
proposed decree comports with the re-
quirements of United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), Wygant v. 
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S . 
267 (1986), and other Supreme Court 
cases governing voluntary affirmative-
action plans. 
Under Weber, voluntary affirmative 
action must be a response to "a manifest 
imbalance" in "traditionally segregated 
job categories" and may not "unnecessar-







of Title VII. 
Wygant and other precedents require that, 
in the case of court-ordered or govern-
mental affmnative action, the discrimina-
tion must have been committed by the 
employer rather than by society at large. 
A retooled fairness hearing would en-
sure that the court receives the benefits of 
advocacy addressing these legal/fairness 
standards on behalf of the absent Category 
3 individuals, despite the absence of an 
adequate representative. If this were 
achieved , a ban on subsequent reverse-
discrimination suits by these employees 
would be justified. 
The difficulty, of course, is in creating a 
mechanism that protects the interests of 
non-parties who are by definition not only 
absent, but also unrepresented. Possible 
approaches to developing such a mecha-
nism are: 
• Human intervention. An amicus, 
such as the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission (where the EEOC is not a 
party), could be appointed by the court to 
argue on behalf of unnamed people poten-
tially affected. A major question , of 
course, is who would pay. 
• Structural correction. Judges might 
follow specific guidelines crafted by an 
entity like the EEOC, an independent 
commission, or an office within the judi-
ciary in assessing affmnative-action plans. 
One problem with this alternative is that 
the best-intentioned judge may miss a 
point an interested litigant would uncover. 
For this reason, the guidelines woUld have 
to reflect the results of careful study of real 
cases, so that the court would be alerted to 
arguments that might have been made if an 
interested party were there to make them. 
• Legality check. The judiciary could 
employ a centralized system for expert 
review of consent decrees. The EEOC, 
when not a party, might serve in this ca-
pacity <>r might coordinate such a system. 
One problem with this alternative is ex-
pense, although money could be saved if 
think tanks and academic institutions 
could be signed up to provide expertise on 
a pro bono basis . 
• Legal presumption. A presumption 
could be worked into the fairness hearing 
against approval of the consent decree or 
judgment in question. The prime difficulty 
with this is that it would undermine a 
heretofore clearly expressed congressional 
preference for settlements. 
None of these is perfect, but neither is 
endless litigation over consent decrees. 
Permitting open-ended collateral chal-
lenges nullifies the positive institutional 
effects of Title VII; prohibiting challenges 
by white employees who . were absent and 
unrepresented when an affmnative-action 
plan was implemented takes too much 
from the majority to protect the minority. 
The solution is not Justice Rehnquist's 
wholesale rejection of the collateral-at-
tack rule , but a new system that includes 
real and enforceable protections of the 
majority. 0 
